Brexit: A threat or an opportunity for UK lawyers and legal London? (Times Law Award Submission)

A fog of Brexit uncertainty for lawyers may thaw in expected ways. Whilst there is no doubt substantial work for lawyers will be generated, our questioner errs by proposing a false binary. Greener pastures for some might be put out for others.

Legal London is experiencing an exponential increase of Brexit related work. Many firms have recruited academics, business advisors and extra practitioners, bolstering their expertise and strengthening their offering. Clients looking to side step the consequences of Brexit are wisely instructing lawyers for assistance in navigating the unknown. In the short-term, this growth will only continue. From corporate clients requiring complex advice on business reorganisation, to private individuals seeking to best position their assets post Brexit. Whether their clients stand to gain or lose money, lawyers will be both available and invaluable. 


International dispute resolution is an area likely to grow. Judgements from such cases will still be entirely enforceable outside of the UK, as they encounter similar procedures of enforcement as in non-EU member states. The differing procedures however will create new challenges and thus legal work for this area. Also, the simplicity of enforcement within the EU is replicable through creating alternative reciprocity arrangement, which would produce further work in this field. Moreover, the suitability of English law for commercial transactions, coupled with the renowned integrity of English courts will not dissolve after Brexit, unaffecting the UK’s attraction as a destination for dispute resolution.


Despite having a withdrawal agreement signed, the negotiations for the Chequers proposal are yet to take their first steps. As Chequers is painfully vague, the eventual agreement itself is almost impossible to predict. Consequently, areas like mergers and acquisitions have slowed in anticipation of acting on the relevant trade agreement when made. However, mergers and acquisitions litigation will ignite once the future trade agreement is reached, and much like international dispute resolution, business is likely to grow in the long-term. However, opportunities may not come to all. 


Long-term forecasts for finance and banking lawyers appear more troublesome. Great concern looms over the fate of passporting. Passporting enables Banks and financial services firms to trade freely with any other EU or European Economic Area (EEA) country. If equivalent provisions are excluded from a Brexit trade agreement, some banks and multinational financial service providers could reduce their UK operations, either relocating to another EEA country, or moving subsidiaries there. Inevitably this incurs initial demand, yet the long-term legal work generated by these bodies will leave along with their clients. Though finance is a single area, the vast amount of revenue otherwise generated by financial services work will be noticeably absent, both to firms and the Treasury. 


That said, the City of London will not lose its status as an elite global financial centre. Expect no exodus. Even though London is likely to retain its status, laurels cannot be rested on. As European capitals such as Paris begin to cultivate English speaking courts, competition for cross-border dispute resolution will only become fiercer. A nonchalant legal London could pay a severe price. Whilst the benefits of Brexit may be reaped today, great challenges in ensuring London remains competitive will arrive soon by tomorrow. 


Economic stability post-Brexit will be critical for the continued legal industry buoyance. A no-deal scenario would be most unfavourable. This could potentially shed £3bn from the legal industry by 2025, and, if the Bank of England is correct, could shrink the economy by 8% immediately after Brexit. Despite a recession, a devaluation of the pound could render the UK an attractive investment opportunity for international clients, generating more work for lawyers still. Yet firms heavily reliant on cross-border transactional work would experience profitability decline, as investment into a newly turbulent economy would be highly unlikely to offset the consequences of a recession. Economic downturn potentially has even wider consequences for the legal industry.


Criminal practitioners might suffer indirect consequences from a post-Brexit recession. Austerity measures made a sacrificial lamb out of the criminal justice system after the 2008 recession. It would come as little surprise if the Ministry of Justice’s rhetoric of fat cat lawyers, rich off the public purse, was wheeled out once again to justify another savaging of legal aid. It seems then, Brexit may even be a distant threat to criminal lawyers. Whilst criminal practitioners will not encounter restrictions in practice resulting from Brexit, lawyers with cross-border practises will.


Based on the draft withdrawal agreement reached on 14th November, the apparent willingness of both the UK and EU to compromise suggests a no-deal scenario is unlikely. However, both Chequers and no-deal scenarios appear to leave the UK outside of the single market for services. Also, it seems most likely the UK will fall outside of the EEA. This will have three significant consequences for UK lawyers practising in the EU. First, lawyers qualified in the UK can currently represent clients in the European Court of Justice, a freedom that may require further hurdles once Brexit occurs. Second, legal privilege afforded to UK lawyers in EU cases could potentially be rescinded and third, the current ability to draw up contracts in 15 EU countries could be lost as well. Unless negotiations retain these privileges, UK lawyers will face substantial disadvantages over their EU counterparts. For those with cross-border practices, Brexit presents perhaps the most immediate threat. As such, lobbying robustly to secure mechanisms that enable cross-border practice and financial services freedoms should be prioritised. 


Great caution should be taken not to rejoice blindly on the prosperity Brexit currently brings to the industry. Failure to acknowledge the long-term challenges Brexit places upon lawyers in certain areas is to ignore that Brexit is both, ultimately, opportunity and threat. 



'Defending the Guilty' - Alex McBride | Review (Joe's Budget Books)

My review of 'Defending the Guilty' by Alex McBride is now posted on my Budget Book blog. 


'Defending the Guilty' is centred around the age old question asked to anyone studying or practising law: how can you defend the guilty? With entertaining stories from McBride's career at the bar, Defending the guilty is well worth a read.

If you would like to read my review of the book, you can find it here:
https://joebookclub.wixsite.com/joesbudgetbooks/single-post/2018/07/16/Defending-the-Guilty---Alex-McBride-Review

Reform for Acid Attack Sentences: Is it necessary?



The number of crimes involving the use of acid in the United Kingdom has increased exponentially. Specifically, assaults involving corrosive substances have doubled since 2012. The police state there have been 504 reports of such offences in 2016-17. London has seen the most dramatic rise and is the setting for the vast majority of acid related offences. The injuries resulting from these assaults are typically catastrophic, disfiguring and life-changing. As such, public demand for preventative and punitive measures in order to tackle the rise of acid attacks has increased accordingly.

The Government has responded, entertaining the possibility of new laws, more robust sentences, voluntary restrictions of sale and a consultation. Most recently, acid has been specifically categorised by the sentencing council as a ‘highly dangerous weapon’ in the sentencing guidelines relating to bladed articles and offensive weapons. The ‘two strikes’ rule, whereby offenders convicted twice of possessing an offensive weapon (or threatening to use it twice) receive a six-month prison sentence has now been specifically applied to corrosive substances such as acid.

This post aims to discuss the current legislation, the existing sentencing guidelines relative to those offences including the recent update, and will consider whether proposals for reform, including the calls for tougher sentences, are appropriate.  

The current catalogue of offences

The primary legislation encompassing offences of this kind is covered by s.18 of the Offences Against the Person Act (OAPA) 1861, and s.29 of the same act. S.18 covers intentionally causing grievous (serious) bodily harm, and s.29 deals with throwing a corrosive fluid on a person with the intention of causing serious bodily harm. The maximum sentence for both of these offences is life imprisonment. If, as a result of the assault with the use of acid, the person dies, which, due to the utterly devastating effect acid can have on a human being, is a real possibility, a charge of murder is available, carrying a mandatory life sentence.

Whilst there are multiple offences specifically relating to acid contained in the OAPA, such as ‘administering a destructive or noxious thing with intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy’ under s.23 of the Act, the maximum sentence being 5 years, it is likely prosecutions would favour s.18 (or s.20 where intention is absent) due to its familiarity with the Crown Prosecution Service and practitioners. S.24 is similarly worded, save for use of the noxious thing must endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm. The maximum sentences for s.24 and s.23 are 5 years and 10 years respectively, though again, it is unlikely these offences would be preferred over the more well known and established s.18 and s.20.

Other than using acid as a weapon, there are two other situations where regulation is applied to acid: possession and sale. The possession of corrosive substances, is covered under the offence of Possession an Offensive Weapon under s.1 Prevention of Crime Act 1953. Whilst the possession of acid was presumably captured under this offence previously, the sentencing guidelines now makes express reference to acid as a highly dangerous weapon. Additionally, if this conviction is for a second relevant offence, the court must impose a sentence of 6 months imprisonment, unless there are particular circumstances relating to the offender, offence or previous offence that make it ‘unjust to do so in all the circumstances’. The mandatory minimum of 6 months applies to both possession and threats to use offensive weapons. The maximum sentence for such an offence is 4 years imprisonment. 

The recent change to the sentencing guidelines can be found here:

For the sale of corrosive substances, relevant legislation is contained within the Poisons Act 1972. It should be noted however, that whilst the sale of certain corrosive and poisonous substances is regulated to a certain extent by the Act, the sale and purchase of the types of acids typically used in these types of offences is not in itself illegal. The Poisons Act distinguishes between regulated harmful substances and less harmful substances, which are 'reportable'. Substances listed as less harmful on the reportable list include hydrochloric acid, ammonia and various compounds of arsenic, but other arsenic compounds are also listed in the regulated section.

The Poisons Act requires a person to report the sale of one of the ‘reportable substances’ if they have reasonable grounds for believing the transaction is suspicious. The purchase is suspicious if the vendor has reasonable grounds for believing it is ‘intended for illicit use’, which can be evidenced by factors such as the customers inability to explain its use plausibly, arp increase in gang-related violence and acid attacks to not be related to the res could signifiantly   their initial offence. an unwillingness to provide proof of identity or an insistence on using cash. [1] The indicators for illicit use are not exhaustive. As a summary only offence, the maximum sentence is 3 months and/or a fine.

A voluntary ban on the sale of corrosive substances to under-18s has been adopted by major retailers such as Wickes, B&Q and many others after a government recommendation, though this is optional and at the time of writing, remains voluntarily enforced.     

The case for reform

The case for new law and/or tougher sentences in relation to acid attacks themselves may be unnecessary, as s.18 already carries the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The only possible avenue of increasing severity for such offences would be to impose mandatory life sentences for those that commit acid attacks. However, the only crime that currently carries a mandatory life sentence is murder. If the same were to be applied to acid attacks, this would unavoidably dilute the severity of a punishment reserved for the most serious of all crimes.

Second, the imposition of mandatory sentences disregards the utility of the judge’s discretion. Whilst almost all attacks involving the use of acid will result in truly dreadful injuries, it is possible to obtain a conviction under s.18 if serious harm has occurred, but there may be various degrees of just how serious one’s injuries may be. A person may throw acid on to another causing absolutely horrendous burns and disfiguring scars to the legs of their victim. A proportionally serious sentence would be entirely justified in the aforementioned scenario. Equally though, one may see reason in applying a more severe sentence in the case of Berlinah Wallace, who doused her ex-lover’s face and body in sulphuric acid whilst he slept semi-naked, resulting in burns to 90% of his body, blinding him, paralysing him from the neck down, resulting in the amputation of a leg and ridding him of his ability to speak. She received a life sentence.

Third, the differentiating deterrent effect between knowing one will certainly receive a life sentence if convicted, and there being a mere likelihood of receiving a life sentence is arguably minimal. Whilst the incapacitive and retributive functions of introducing a mandatory life sentence for those who commit such crimes is arguably not without value, it is relatively unlikely to be a measure which would realistically reduce the rate of offences. It is submitted in light of the points above, the current sentencing powers available to judges in relation to acid attacks are sufficient as the only more severe alternative is unjustified.

Whilst specifying that acid attackers are to receive the same 6-month mandatory sentencing for two offences of possessing a corrosive substance as those who carry knives in public do, it is uncertain as to whether this will have either a deterring effect in acid-related crimes. On face value, it certainly seems that as acid can be just as dangerous as knives, if not more so, it is logical to apply the same provisions of sentencing to this type of possession offence. Measures which are in essence preventative should be praised, and it is a welcomed improvement to the current guidelines that corrosive substances, such as acid, are clarified as highly dangerous weapons. Criminalising possession of such substances in public is perhaps a wise measure, in what will hopefully be a wider and comprehensive set of tools in combating such crimes. 

One of the more obvious areas for reform would be the Poisons Act 1972. The offence of not reporting the suspicious transaction of a reportable substance appears to lack teeth and presents clear issues of enforceability. One of the primary issues is that many, if not most, who purchase acid intending to use it as a weapon purchase it online. An online purchase has no shopkeeper to assess suspiciousness, and the Act shows its age in s.3C(4) when listing the indicators of suspiciousness, presuming all transactions will be undertaken in a physical shop.

It may be appropriate for the Act to be updated to implement further regulation that makes provision for digital sales of acid, as well as whether licensing or a form of robust checking is appropriate for the availability of acid. A consideration of whether an updated list of substances, compiled from the data of previous acid attacks and possession offences is appropriate may also be sensible, and a proper evaluation on whether the strict limitation of the sale of these substances is likely to reduce the rate of offences.

In the Government's consultation on new legislation for offensive and dangerous weapons, respondents to the consultation were highly supportive of introducing restrictions for the sale of corrosive substances. The responses supported bringing in legislation to mirror the restrictions of sales with respect to knives, applicable to online sales as well, with similar defences available to retailers who take reasonable precautions and exercise due diligence. Legislation to specifically define corrosive substances was supported, though with caution added in so far that such changes should be infrequent to ensure certainty and based on scientific evidence. Respondents also emphasised the importance of education and awareness for young people around corrosive substances in order to reduce their usage. It is submitted the latter point may be the most difficult, perhaps even the most expensive, but almost certainly of critical importance in reducing the crime figure.
                                                                                                                                              
A summary of the responses to the Government’s consultation on new legislation relating to the sale and possession of acid can be found here:

Bangladesh experienced a similarly grim rise in the number of acid attacks in early to mid 90s. It passed two measures in response, one criminalising the offence of attacking others with acid,[2] and the second, criminalising the sale, use, importation and unlicensed production of acid.[3] The number of acid attacks in Bangladesh has decreased by an average of 15%-17% each year, from a high of 494 in 2002, to a number of 39 incidents in 2017.[4] Though these statistics could have inaccuracies as they are based mostly on media reports rather than official figures, it is generally accepted that Bangladesh has experienced a notable reduction in acid crimes, and that the laws enacted in 2002 were a contributing factor, despite significant difficulties in implementation.[5]  

Josh Normanton and Elaine Freer, barristers of 5 Paper Buildings, argue that it is the robust penalties for those that possess, sell or produce acid, as set out in the Acid Control Act, that have the greatest potential for replication in the England and Wales, and could make an impact in reducing acid attacks. Increasing the penalties for retailers who do not adhere to the strict controls related to acid is argued for as well, as it is likely to increase diligence and thus further restrict the availability of acid. They also point out that whilst Bangladesh has experienced significant implementation problems, due to various factors such as corruption, England and Wales generally fairs better with implementing new law. As such, similar measures may even result in an improvement over the reduction percentage experienced in Bangladesh.

Josh Normanton and Elaine Freer’s post can be found here:

Controlling the availability of acid is perhaps more likely to make the most significant dent in the incident rate of acid attacks above increasing sentences on the logic it would deter other potential acid attackers. As a relatively recent phenomenon, it is unknown if the motivations of acid attackers remain just a potent on their release from prison than at the time of their initial offence. If a high reoffending rate could be shown for acid attackers, reconsidering higher sentences may be warranted, though it would still appear that the availability of a life sentence to a judge is more than adequate for their assessment of dangerousness.

Issues of enforcement

Enforcing new measures for controlling of acid, should such restrictions be introduced, would present a significant difficulty. With police forces suffering significant shortages and limited resources, as well as catastrophic cuts to the CPS and court staff, accommodating and properly investigating crimes related to the sale of acid would inevitably add to the strain. Accordingly, should new measures come in to force, it would be imperative that funding for police and courts to adequately accommodate enforcement is allocated alongside.

It is possible, though unproven, that the sharp increase in gang-related violence and acid attacks is related to the lower number of police constables on the street, as a result of the increasingly stretched and underfunded police force. Considerations for increased funding for police, especially in London, might be of an even higher priority, relative to crime reduction, than introducing new legislation, if acid attack figures are to be combated with any effectiveness.

Conclusion

The current catalogue of legislation criminalising those who use acid to devastating effect is both comprehensive and adequately available to prosecutors and judges who face dealing with such horrendous crimes. Both offences under S.18 and s.29 have a maximum sentence of life imprisonment available, which has previously been used. To increase that maximum to a mandatory life sentence, mirroring that applied to murder, would remove the judge’s discretion, producing unfairness, inconsistent results and would dilute the severity of the offence of murder.

Whilst reform is perhaps unwarranted for tougher maximum sentences in terms of s.18 or s.29, tighter controls and increased penalties for retailers for the sale and unlicensed production of acid have the potential to be effective. These might include requiring identification and reporting sales to the police. Such measures would hope to replicate the reduction of such crimes seen in Bangladesh with similar controls. Amendments to the Poisons Act 1972 or new legislation could facilitate this, though any significant reduction to the number of acid attacks would be unlikely without a holistic package of reforms. Education and awareness regarding consequences for young people would invariably play a crucial role. Most importantly however is the adequate allocation of funding to police forces. Without this funding, accommodating the significant enforcement challenges these measures would inevitably encounter would almost certainly fall short.




[1] S.3C(4) Poisons Act 1972
[2] Acid Offence Prevention Act 2002 (Bangladesh)
[3] Acid Control Act 2002 (Bangladesh)
[4] http://www.acidsurvivors.org/Statistics

Clause 8(e): The Cambridge Analytica enabling clause

I'm very pleased that Legal Cheek & BARBI selected this essay for the 2nd place prize in their 2018 Privacy Law Essay Competition. 

Introduction

When a major scandal emerges, the trope of ‘something must be done’ usually arrives shortly after. Thankfully, something is already being done.  The Data Protection Bill is currently making its way through the legislative process, and at the time of writing, is about to enter the report stage of the House of Commons on the 9th May 2018. However the bill is not without issue.

The Cambridge Analytica scandal

In 2014, Cambridge University researcher Aleksandr Kogan in collaboration with Cambridge Analytica, used an app called ‘ThisIsYourDigitalLife to pay around 270,000 Facebook users to take a personality test. With their consent, this harvested the data of those users. However, as well as harvesting the data of the paid users, the app harvested the data of their friends too, resulting in the collection of up to 87 million individuals’ data. Cambridge Analytica was later hired by the pro-brexit campaign group Leave.EU in 2015 and by Trump’s presidential campaign in 2016. It is currently unclear to what extent this data was used in these campaigns, but a whistle-blower has attested that it was used extensively.

Can Cambridge Analytica’s behaviour be repeated?

Prior to 2015, Facebook allowed app developers to collect user data from Facebook using their own apps, which permitted the collection of friends’ data to improve user experience in the app, but not for it to be used for advertising or to be sold on. Facebook changed these rules after 2015, removing this ability. Cambridge Analytica broke the user agreement by misusing the data it collected for advertising.  That is not to say what was done can not be repeated, but it can not be repeated in the same way.

Data can be harvested via an app in largely the same manner, though the collection will no longer be so vast from a relatively small participation size. Data can be bought, but again, it is unlikely to be of such large size. Even so, greater data protection laws are imminent with the advent of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Data Protection Bill.

The legislative framework

The Data Protection Bill will implement the vast majority of the (GDPR). There is a plethora of changes contained in the Bill, focused on providing greater access to the data that companies hold, as well as giving greater power the Information Commissioners Office to uphold information rights.

Some notable changes include the requirement for businesses to obtain a ‘positive opt-in’, clearly explaining that consent is being given when they intend to rely on consent to lawfully use a person’s information. The £10 charge for a Subject Access Request will now be free and there will be greater powers to request erasing data. The GDPR also increases the severity of fines for organisations who mishandle an individual’s data. The maximum fine has gone from £500,000 to up to 10 million or 2% of the firms global turnover (whichever is greater).

In general, the stricter regulation of data protection from the GDPR can be seen as a victory for the privacy conscious social media user. Though currently what is troubling is not the prospect of what might enter the bill, but what it already contains. There are some parts of the Data Protection Bill that have caused concern, most notably, clause 8 (e).

Data Protection Bill: The problem with clause 8(e)

This subtly concerning clause emerged in the draft bill after an amendment was agreed. Clause 8(e) states that an ‘activity that supports or promotes democratic engagement’ is an example of a necessary process of personal data that could be undertaken on the grounds of lawfulness in the public interest. This clause gives good reason to be concerned.

First, with such an extremely wide scope of activity potentially included in this provision, it has the capability of including the campaigning tactics of Cambridge Analytica. This has the effect of legitimising their behaviour, and potentially forms an enabling provision.

It would not be outrageous to suggest that the amendment appears to be inserted out of concern that politicians will hamstring themselves when processing data during campaigns. The ease at which data could be used tactically during campaigns will no doubt be of great concern to politicians. It is easy to see this as a politically self-serving amendment, rather than one which is in the spirit of the GDPR.

Furthermore, Recital 45 of the GDPR does not afford the extremely wide ambit of all democratic activities which clause 8(e) does. Bundling clause 8(e) with clauses (a)-(d) affords it the enormous scope the other deliberately wide clauses cater for. However, clause 8(e) is far more susceptible to abuse, which has the capacity to arise in the form of Cambridge Analytica’s strategies.  

Second, as clause 8(e) applies to any data controller, this amendment largely conflicts with the processing of political opinions, a special category of data in Article 9 of the Bill, which is reserved for registered political parties, as opposed to any data controller. The clause consequently puts a much looser constraint on the processing of such data.

Troublesome still, is that whilst clause 8(e) of the Data Protection Bill was inserted 13th March 2018, and the expose of Cambridge Analytica published a matter of days later on 17th March, successive hearings have failed to show any indication of amending Clause 8(e).

Concluding remarks

Whilst the Data Protection Bill introduces a largely welcomed arsenal of tools to ensure data is handled properly, clause 8 (e) displays a worrying exception. Its primary issue is its scope, and the potential for it to become a form of protection for the tactics of Cambridge Analytica. The scope should be dramatically reduced, and with ample opportunity for this change to be implemented, there is little excuse for it to be left in its current form.