'Stories of the Law and how It's Broken' - Secret Barrister | Review (Joe's Budget Books)

My review of the 'Stories of the Law and how it's Broken' is now on my book club blog 'Joe's Budget Books'. It's an extraordinarily frank assessment of the criminal bar, and an incredibly important read for law students and politicians. 


The Secret Barrister is one of the best legal bloggers online. Many of the posts on this blog have been made reference to the excellent posts on the Secret Barrister's blog. Stories of the law and how its broken demonstrates the scale of the problem with the crumbling criminal justice system, and why it is so important to fight for it. It's undoubtedly one of the best and most important books I've read recently.

If you would like to read my review of the book, you can find it here:
https://joebookclub.wixsite.com/joesbudgetbooks/single-post/2018/05/29/Stories-of-the-Law-and-How-Its-Broken---The-Secret-Barrister-Review

A Study in Causation - Case in Focus: R v Wallace [2018] EWCA Crim 690



Introduction

The use of acid as a weapon has unfortunately become a horrific trend in the United Kingdom, with the potential to deliver catastrophic and life changing harm. The case of R v Wallace involves truly appalling injuries. The suffering resultant from those injuries led the victim to undergo euthanasia. Haunting though the case is, the decision from the Court of Appeal raises interesting issues of causation. Where a person commits suicide from their injuries, even where the person was not likely to die of those injuries, it may mean that the defendant can be found guilty of murder.

Facts

Berlinah Wallace and Mark van Dongen had been in a relationship for approximately 5 years.  Van Dongen had ended the relationship, and left Wallace for another woman. On 23rd September 2015, van Dongen went to Wallace’s house and stayed the night. Wallace had purchased 1L of 98% concentrated sulphuric acid over the internet, prior to van Dongen’s visit. As van Dognen slept, wearing only his boxer shorts, Wallace shouted ‘if I can’t have you, nobody can’, and threw a full glass of acid over van Dongen’s face and body.

As van Dongen screamed out in pain, running into the street to seek help, a nonchalant Wallace phoned a friend. She made no attempt to contact the emergency services. The resulting injuries to van Dongen were catastrophic. The burns and subsequent skin grafts covered over 40% of his total body area. He spent 11 months in intensive care, losing full sight in his left eye, and most of the sight in his right eye. He suffered the amputation of his leg left, damage to his bowels, septicaemia, kidney damage, chest infections, and later developed Critical Illness Neuropathy which rendered him paralysed from the neck down. His facial scarring was of the most severe category.

With his family's help, van Dongen moved to Belgium, where his father lived. Whilst he regained the use of his speech, after several months, due to a lung infection, van Dongen required a tube to be inserted into his throat. The procedure carried a very high risk that he would lose his voice, though if he did not have the tube inserted, he would die. 

Under certain strict circumstances, euthanasia is legal in Belgium. Among several other criteria, Belgian doctors must be satisfied the patient was in a ‘medically futile condition of constant and unbearable physical or mental suffering that cannot be alleviated’ in order to carry out such a process. Van Dongen applied for euthanasia in Belgium on 1st December 2016. On 2nd January 2017, doctors ended his life.

Wallace was charged initially with applying a corrosive fluid with intent contrary to section 29 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. After van Dongen’s death, she was also charged with murder.

The appeal

The discussion this post focuses on comes from an appeal from the prosecution. The appeal sought to challenge a decision by the judge at trial, who accepted a submission of no case to answer in relation to the murder charge. The trial judge accepted the reasoning that - had the euthanasia been conducted in this jurisdiction, it would have been murder, and that would have inevitably broken the causal link between the actions of the defendant and van Dongen’s death. The trial judge therefore withdrew the charge of murder from the jury. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge, and ruled that murder could be considered by the jury, which necessitated a retrial. A summary of the comprehensive discussion regarding causation will be detailed below.

The full decision of the Court of Appeal can be found here:

Conviction and sentence

After a retrial, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty in relation to the murder charge, and a verdict of guilty to the charge under s.29 of the 1861 act. In the relatively lengthy sentencing remarks, the judge emphasised the cruelty of the crime, the horrific extent of van Dongen’s injuries and the complete lack of remorse Wallace demonstrated. The judge gave Wallace a life sentence, with a minimum term of 12 years to be served before she can be considered eligible for parole. Only once this term is served, and the parole board consider Wallace to no longer be a danger to the public, will she be released. She will also remain on licence for the rest of her life.

The sentencing remarks can be found here:

How could a jury find Wallace guilty of s.29, but not murder?

As a jury always deliberates in secret, free from all external influence, this is unknown. However, the appeal document is very helpful in this regard as it provides a template for the directions to be given to the jury.  Though the exact words may not have been delivered by the judge, it is highly likely the trial judge used a similar version of these questions, albeit tailored to the evidence presented at trial.

The suggested questions of the Court of Appeal are pasted below to give a sense of what the jurors would have been asked before determining their verdict.

1. Are you sure that the defendant deliberately threw acid over Mr van Dongen? 

2. Are you sure that at the time of the attack the defendant intended to kill Mr van Dongen or at least cause him serious bodily harm?

3.In order to convict the defendant (of murder) you must be sure that the defendant’s unlawful act of throwing acid over Mr van Dongen caused his death.

That is a question of fact that you should answer using your collective common sense. It is common ground that but for the injuries caused by the acid attack, Mr van Dongen would not have undergone voluntary euthanasia. If you are sure this is the case, go on to ask yourself:

3(a). Are you sure that the defendant’s unlawful act of throwing acid over Mr van Dongen was a significant and operating cause of death?

The injuries do not need to be the only cause of death but they must play more than a minimal part in causing Mr van Dongen’s death.

Consider all the circumstances, including the nature and extent of Mr van Dongen’s injuries, the passage of time, intervening events, the involvement of the doctors in carrying out the voluntary euthanasia at Mr van Dongen’s request, what Mr van Dongen was told and what he said.

If your answer is yes, proceed to question 3(b). If you are not sure, your verdict on (the count of murder) will be not guilty.

3(b). Are you sure that at the time of the acid attack it was reasonably foreseeable that a defendant would commit suicide as a result of his injuries.

In answering this question consider all the circumstances, including the nature of the attack, what the defendant did and said at the time and whether or not Mr van Dongen’s decision to undergo voluntary euthanasia fell within the range of responses which might have been expected from a victim in his situation.

If your answer is yes your verdict on count 1 will be guilty. If your answer is no, your verdict on (the count of murder) will be not guilty.[1]
           
So, a jury may be sure that the defendant deliberately threw acid over van Dongen. It may also be sure Wallace at least intended to cause really serious bodily harm. Being satisfied of these questions would be enough to return a verdict of guilty in relation to the charge of applying a corrosive fluid with intent. They may not, however, because of van Dongen’s decision to have doctors end his life, have been sure that Wallace’s throwing of acid was an operating or substantial cause of his death.

Even if the jury were sure that the throwing of acid was an operating or substantial cause of his death, they may not have been sure that van Dongen’s decision to commit suicide was a reasonably foreseeable result of his injuries. Clearly, the questions posed in 3(a) and 3(b) have elements of causation that may have been difficult to grapple with. This may explain why the jury found the defendant guilty of s.29, but not murder.

How is causation determined?

The judge in the case started out by reiterating a position established in R v Hughes [2013] UKSC, which stated there is not a settled or stable concept or causation, and different legal rulings may apply to different situations. The law has subsequently developed multiple principles to apply in order to determine liability in causation.

The ‘but for’ test forms the foundation of factual causation. The test can be stated as: but for the defendant’s actions, harm would not have come to the victim. Applying this to the present case, but for the throwing of acid by Wallace, van Dongen would not have taken the decision to end his life. The judge re-emphasised that it is wrong to place too much weight on the but for test,[2] but reasoned that ‘the connection between the inflicted injuries and death was…a direct and discernible one…inextricably bound up’ in the actions of the defendant. It could not be disputed that van Dongen’s unbearable suffering was the result of the defendant’s conduct, and but for that unbearable suffering, he would not have requested euthanasia, nor would the Belgian doctors have lawfully carried it out.

However, an intervening act, known as novus actus interveniens is capable of breaking the chain of causation, which potentially absolves the defendant from liability. A prevailing principle within this is referred to in the Court of Appeal judgement, citing a Canadian case, R v Maybin [2012] SSC 24, which states that where an intervening act occurs, if the defendant’s conduct is a substantial and operative cause of the result, the defendant will be responsible. The jury is not tasked with evaluating competing causes to determine which was dominant; citing the principles of R v Smith [1959] 2 Q.B 35, the defendant’s acts need not be the sole cause or even main cause of death. All is required is that the defendant’s acts contributed to the result.[3] Only if the second cause of death is so overwhelming, rendering the original wound ‘merely part of the history’, will the chain of causation be broken.[4]

In R v Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38, the accused prepared a syringe of heroin and gave it to the victim. The victim injected himself, returned the syringe, but died shortly after. As the victim knew what he was doing, and freely and voluntarily chose to inject himself, the chain of causation was broken, and the House of Lords ruled that the accused did not ‘cause’ the drug to be administered. The judge in the present case distinguished Kennedy, stating that the position of the drug addict ‘was not truly analogous’ to the situation of van Dongen. The victim in Kennedy was not faced with responding to the extreme circumstances that van Dongen was, nor, in the judge’s view, were those circumstances created by the accused. The judge went on to say that Wallace put van Dongen in a position requiring him to make a decision he never would have otherwise made. Even though the Belgian doctors considered van Dongen’s request to be ‘voluntary’ adhering to the Belgian euthanasia legislation, the judge did not consider this to be determinative, as due to the truly terrible situation van Dongen was in, his action could not decently be described as voluntary.[5]

In R v Dear [1996] Crim. LR 595, the defendant slashed the face of a man with a Stanley knife,  believing the victim had abused his daughter. The victim received treatment and began to recover but reopened his wounds in an apparent suicide attempt, and subsequently died of his injuries. When considering an intervening act, the jury must be satisfied that the intervening act, if done by the victim, was ‘within the range of responses which might have been expected of him’ in his situation, as held in Dear. It is whether his reaction was so ‘daft to make it (the victim’s) own voluntary act’ and thus break the chain of causation, as held in R v Roberts [1971] 55 Cr. App.R 95. The assessment is objective, based upon the reasonable man's response were he to have the victim’s characteristics, and be placed in their circumstances. Any pre-existing conditions, including religious beliefs, are taken into account.[6]

The judge ruled that the request for euthanasia by van Dongen, and the action taken by the doctors to then end his life could not reasonably be separated. She reasoned that it would be an odd result, where two victims attacked in identical circumstances rendered one able to take his own life but the other requiring assistance from doctors, meant that their attacker could only be legally responsible for one of their victims' death.[7] The judge relied on the decision in Dear to say that ‘seeking death in response to horrific injury does not preclude a jury from finding that the defendant’s conduct made a significant contribution to Mr van Dongen’s death.’[8] The judge accordingly allowed the appeal, and ordered a retrial so that the jury could consider the charge of murder.

Commentary

This decision has potentially wide reaching consequences. It remains to be seen what could be made of a similar, though different set of facts. Where a victim finds himself in circumstances so dire as a result of an injury, whether from acid, knife, firearm or otherwise, his decision to end his life has the potential to turn a charge of grievous bodily harm in to murder. It is suspected the severity of the injuries inflicted, and the response to end one’s life will significantly influence the decision as to whether legal causation is made out, and whether a charge of murder is appropriate. It is difficult to imagine injury and suffering worse than that experienced by Mr van Dongen. It is submitted that in most other cases involving less serious injury, where a victim later takes their own life, a break in the chain of causation is highly probable. As R v Wallace shows, however, this will not always be the case. Nevertheless, Wallace might better be seen as an exception, rather than a rule. 

Conclusion

The principles within causation are complex, and are often unsettled as case law admits. Where intervening acts are concerned, the key question is whether the defendant’s action remains a substantial and operative cause of the result. The defendant remains liable where the victim’s response to the defendant’s act was within a reasonable range of responses considering the circumstances, or they have a pre-existing condition. Whilst a free and voluntary act typically breaks the chain of causation, where that decision arises from extreme circumstances, as this case holds, the defendant may still remain liable.



[1] R v Wallace [2018] EWCA Crim 690, para 86
[2] March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] 171 CLR 506, para 48 of R v Wallace
[3] R v Smith [1959] 2 Q.B. 35
[4] Ibid
[5] R v Wallace [2018] EWCA Crim 690, para 76
[6] R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411
[7] R v Wallace [2018] EWCA Crim 690, para 85
[8] Ibid

Self Defence in 'Householder Cases'



The initial arrest of a pensioner for the killing of an intruder into his home has led to concern from various newspapers and social media commenters regarding the extent to which homeowners are able to defend themselves during a burglary. In this post, I will discuss the law on self-defence and, particularly, how it applies to ‘householder cases’.

Facts

Henry Vincent, 37, and another man broke into the home of Richard Osborne-Brooks, 78, attempting to burgle the property. Osborne-Brooks and his disabled wife, 76, were at home in bed during the break in. Osborne-Brooks discovered the other man and Vincent, who was armed with a screwdriver. After a struggle in the kitchen, Osborne-Brooks fatally stabbed Vincent with Vincent's screwdriver,  and the other man escaped. Osborne-Brooks was later arrested on suspicion of murder and interviewed by police, but later released without charge.

Self-defence

In essence, a person is permitted to use reasonable force in defending themselves. S.3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 states:

‘a person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large’.

The defendant must genuinely believe the level of force he used was reasonable regardless of whether that genuine belief was incorrect. Where self-defence is raised, the burden of proof rests on the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant did not act in reasonable self-defence.

It may be useful to point out, as Osborne-Brooks was suspected of murder (though not charged), had he been tried for murder and raised self-defence, if the prosecution failed to disprove self-defence, he would be not guilty of murder. Unlike other defences specific to murder, such as loss of self-control or diminished responsibility, self-defence is a complete defence, in the sense that he would be found not-guilty. Conversely, loss of self-control, for example, if the prosecution fails to disprove it, would result in a conviction for manslaughter.

What is reasonable force?

In determining what is considered ‘reasonable force’, the Privy Council in Palmer [1971] AC 814 gives guidance, stating:

‘…everything will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances…It may in some cases be only sensible and clearly possible to take some simple avoiding action. Some attacks may be serious and dangerous. Others may not be. If there is some relatively minor attack it would not be common sense to permit some action of retaliation which was wholly out of proportion to the necessities of the situation. If an attack is serious so that it puts someone in immediate peril then immediate defensive action may be necessary. If the moment is one of crisis for someone in imminent danger he may have to avert the danger by some instant reaction’.

‘…a person cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his defensive action. If the jury thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought necessarily that would be the most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken.’

Palmer demonstrates there is no set formula for what reasonable force is, as what is reasonable would be entirely dependant on the circumstances. The determination is made based on what the defendant believed at the time, even if his assessment was mistaken, except where that mistake was induced by intoxication. There is not even a requirement that a person must wait until he is struck first. If it is reasonably necessary, a person may use reasonable force in acting as the initial aggressor, as held in R v Deana, 2 Cr.App.R. 75.

More controversially, as held in R v Martin (Anthony) [2002] 1 Cr.App.R 27, CA, though the court can take account of physical characteristics in deciding what force was reasonable, unless there were exceptional circumstances, it could not take account of the defendant’s psychiatric condition.[1] In R v Oye [2014] 1 Cr.App.R 11 CA, it was held that a person who was insane cannot set the standard of reasonable force by reference to his own insanity.[2]

In a householder case, these factors above, if relevant, will be considered in determining whether a defendant used reasonable force, but there is also an additional factor to consider, namely s.76(5A) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.

Householder cases

There is a special feature for ‘householder’ cases in the form of s.76(5A), and, had Osborne-Brooks been tried, if he relied on self-defence, the jury would be required to consider this statutory provision in addition to the ordinary assessment of reasonableness. Whilst in practice what s.76(5A) may change is particularly slight, its consideration is nonetheless required as part of a jury’s decision as to what was reasonable.

S.76(5A) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 was introduced to bolster the protection of homeowners who used force against intruders. The provision provides that in a householder case, the degree of force used by the defendant, is ‘not to be regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances as (he) believed them to be if it was grossly disproportionate in those circumstances’.

This differs from the following provision at s.76(6), which covers a non-householder case, and uses the same language, but excludes the word ‘grossly’. From this, a grossly disproportionate level of force in a householder case will not be considered reasonable, whereas in a non-householder case, a disproportionate level of force will not be considered reasonable. This was perhaps an odd distinction to make, which led to the Court of Appeal having clarifying the law.

In the Court of Appeal’s clarification, Ray [2017] EWCA Crim 1391 held that in a householder case, a jury must first establish the facts, and decide in those circumstances whether the degree of force used was reasonable or not. Then, if the jury decides the degree of force was not grossly disproportionate, s.76(5A) requires considering if the degree of force was reasonable taking account of all the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. If the degree of force was grossly disproportionate, the defence cannot succeed. It held that s.76(5A) does not mean that the use of disproportionate force, which falls short of grossly disproportionate, is automatically reasonable. However, it does mean that disproportionate force, so long as it is not grossly disproportionate, may be reasonable in a householder case, whereas in a non-householder case, it will not be.  

The court also said that the judge should be careful in summing up to the jury in a householder case, and should explain that Parliament has conferred a greater latitude in such cases, and what ‘might be an unreasonable degree of force used when confronting an aggressive individual in a club might not be so when used by a householder confronting an intruder in his own home.’[3] As with any other case of self-defence however, there is no carte blanche on the level of force a homeowner can inflict, and a careful consideration of what in the circumstances was reasonable is, still, required.

Osborne-Brooks’ case

As it is impossible to know the full details of what occurred the night Vincent and his accomplice broke into Osborne-Brooks’ house, trying to make an assessment of what was reasonable based on the facts reported in media outlets would inevitably involve conjuring details. Whilst there may be concern by members of the public that a person could be prosecuted in such a case, reassurance can be sought that wider parameters are afforded to householders in these cases, and all of the circumstances will be considered. Only when force used appears to be unreasonable should a decision to prosecute be taken. As no such charge against Osborne-Brooks was made, it is fair to assume the police considered his actions to be reasonable in the circumstances. 

Concern and outrage may be directed to the fact that Osborne-Brooks was arrested in the first place. Though it might reasonable to point out that as a loss of life had occurred, a thorough and prudent investigation is entirely necessary. At the very least, a police interview with proper cautions given would be required to ascertain what happened. His information in explaining how Vincent came to have been killed would have been imperative to the police. Whilst the facts may be clear to one reading the reports now, it is perhaps useful to remind ourselves of how those facts probably came to be known; most likely from the evidence provided by Osborne-Brooks.

What cases have been prosecuted?

Prosecutions in householder cases appear to be rare in any event. The BBC reports that in a period of 15 years, between 1990-2005, only 11 prosecutions were made against those who attacked their intruders, and of that figure, only 7 involved domestic burglaries. Of those cases, many would agree that the force used clearly went beyond what society could accept as reasonable. Lord MacDonald, former DPP, spoke of one such case, which involved a defendant who set a trap for a burglar at his commercial warehouse. Once captured, he bound the burglar, threw him in a pit and set him on fire.[4]

For the public, not all cases might be considered as straightforward. In R v Martin (Anthony) [2002] 1 Cr.App.R 27, CA mentioned above, a man living in an isolated farmhouse who had been persistently burgled waited for the a pair of intruders with a shotgun. After shooting indiscriminately at them, the defendant fatally shot one of the intruders in the back. Charged with murder, his defence of self-defence was unsuccessful. Only later was his conviction substituted for manslaughter after successfully arguing diminished responsibility.  Media outlets largely condemned his conviction.

Conclusion

It is important to be clear and measured when discussing how self-defence operates in a householder case. Burglaries occur frequently, and it would be a strong public disservice to disseminate the falsehood that a person who defends themselves from a burglar is likely to be prosecuted. Where reasonable force is used in defending oneself, a person acts within the law. Only where force used goes beyond that, such as binding a person, throwing them in to a pit and setting fire to them, or shooting someone in the back whilst they are running away, is a conviction likely to be secured. The infinite combination of circumstances undoubtedly produces uncertainty, and consequently concern that if someone was unfortunate enough to have to defend themselves against a burglar, they would face prison. However, from the very low number of prosecutions, s.76(5A)’s further protection, and the relatively generous factors that can be considered in a determination of reasonableness, there is little need for concern. 



[1] Archbold 2015, chapter 19, 19-47, page 2022
[2] Ibid
[3] Ray [2017]
[4] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20398432